We design a new algorithm for the Euclidean k-means problem that operates in the local model of differential privacy. Unlike in the non-private literature, differentially private algorithms for the k-means incur both additive and multiplicative errors. Our algorithm significantly reduces the additive error while keeping the multiplicative error the same as in previous state-of-the-art results. Specifically, on a database of size n, our algorithm guarantees O(1) multiplicative error and ≈ n 1/2+a additive error for an arbitrarily small constant a, whereas all previous algorithms in the local model on had additive error ≈ n 2/3+a . We give a simple lower bound showing that additive error of ≈ √ n is necessary for k-means algorithms in the local model (at least for algorithms with a constant number of interaction rounds, which is the setting we consider in this paper).
Introduction
In center-based clustering, we aim to find a "best" set of centers (w.r.t. some cost function), and then partition the data points into clusters by assigning each data point to its nearest center. With over 60 years of research, center-based clustering is an intensively-studied key-problem in unsupervised learning. One of the most well-studied problems in this context is the Euclidean k-means problem. In this problem we are given a set of input points S ⊆ R d and our goal is to identify a set C of k centers in R d , approximately minimizing the sum of squared distances from each input point to its nearest center. This quantity is referred to a the cost of the centers w.r.t. the set of points. That is, cost S (C) = x∈S min c∈C x − c 2 .
The huge applicability of k-means clustering, together with the increasing awareness and demand for user privacy, motivated a long line of research on privacy preserving k-means clustering. In this work we study the Euclidean k-means problem in the local model of differential privacy (LDP). Differentially private algorithms work in two main modalities: trusted-curator and local.
The trusted-curator model assumes a trusted curator that collects all the personal information and then analyzes it. The privacy guarantee in this model is that the outcome of the analysis "hides" the information of any single individual (but this information is not hidden from the trusted curator). In contrast, the local model of differential privacy, which is the model we consider in this work, does not involve a trusted curator. In this model, there are n users and an untrusted server, where each user i is holding a private input item x i (a point in R d in our case), and the server's goal is to compute some function of the inputs (approximate the k-means in our case). However, in this model, the users do not send their data as is to the server. Instead, every user randomizes her data locally, and only sends noisy reports to the server, who aggregates all the reports. Informally, the privacy requirement is that the input of user i has almost no effect on the distribution on the messages that user i sends to the server. We refer to the collection of user inputs S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) as a "distributed database" (as it is not stored in one location, and every x i is only held locally by user i). This model is used in practice by large corporations to ensure that private data never reaches their servers in the clear.
As minimizing the k-means objective is NP-hard (even without privacy constraints), the literature has focused on approximation algorithms, with the current (non-private) state-of-the-art achieving a multiplicative error of 6.357 [2] . That is, the algorithm of [2] identifies a set of k centers whose cost is no more than 6.357 times the lowest possible cost, which we denote as OPT S (k). Unlike in the non-private literature, it is known that every differentially private algorithm for approximating the k-means must also have an additive error, which scales with the diameter of the input space. This is true both in the local model and in the trusted-curator model, even for computationally unbounded algorithms. Hence, a standard assumption for private k-means is that the input points come from the d-dimensional ball of radius Λ around the origin B(0, Λ). This is the setting we consider in this work, where we assume that Λ = 1 in the introduction.
There has been a significant amount of work aimed at constructing differentially private kmeans algorithms that work in the trusted-curator model [9, 22, 12, 20, 14, 21, 29, 25, 26, 24, 13, 5, 23, 16, 18] . The current state-of-the-art construction by Kaplan and Stemmer [18] obtains an O(1) multiplicative error and poly(log(n), k, d) additive error. That is, given a set of n input points S ∈ (R d ) n , the algorithm of [18] privately identifies a set C of k centers such that cost S (C) ≤ O(1) · OPT S (k) + poly(log(n), k, d).
On the other hand, for the local model of differential privacy, only two constructions are available (with provable utility guarantees). The first construction, by Nissim and Stemmer [23] , obtains O(k) multiplicative error and ≈ n 2/3 additive error. 1 In addition to the relatively large multiplicative and additive errors, another downside of the algorithm of [23] , is that it requires O(k·log(n)) rounds of interaction between the users and the untrusted server. Following the work of [23] , Kaplan and Stemmer [18] presented an improved locally-private k-means algorithm that requires only O(1) rounds of interaction and guarantees a multiplicative error of O(1) and an additive error of ≈ n 2/3 . That is, the algorithm of [18] reduced the number of interaction rounds while at the same time reducing the multiplicative error to a constant. However, the additive error still remained large. In this work we reduce the additive error to ≈ √ n while keeping all other complexities the same, i.e., with O(1) rounds of interaction and with O(1) multiplicative error.
We remark that additive error of √ n is what one would expect in the local model of differential privacy, as this turned out to be the correct dependency of the error in n for many other problems, including the heavy-hitters problem, median estimations, answering counting queries, and more. Indeed, in Section 5 we show that every locally-private algorithm for the k-means that uses O(1) rounds of interaction must have additive error Ω( √ n). Hence, our positive result is almost optimal in terms of the dependency of the additive error in the database size n.
Reference # Rounds Multiplicative Error Additive Error
Nissim and Stemmer [23] O(k log n) O(k)Õ n 2/3+a · d 1/3 · √ k
Kaplan and Stemmer [18] O(1) O(1)Õ n 2/3+a · d 1/3 · k 2
This work O(1) O(1)Õ n 1/2+a · k · max{ √ d, √ k} Table 1 : Locally-private algorithms for k-means in the d-dimensional Euclidean space. Here n is the number of input points, k is the number of desired centers, d is the dimension, and a > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant. We assume that input points come from the unit ball. For simplicity, we use theÕ notation to hide the privacy parameters ε, δ, the failure probability β, and logarithmic factors in k, n, d.
Existing Techniques
Before presenting the new ideas of this work, we need to understand the reasons for why the previous results only achieved an additive error of ≈ n 2/3 . To that end, we give here an informal overview of the construction of [18] . This intuitive overview is generally oversimplified, and hides many of the difficulties that arise in the actual analysis. Let S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ (R d ) n be a (distributed) database such that every user i holds the input x i ∈ R d . At a high level, the algorithm of [18] can be summarized as follows:
1. Privately identify a set of candidate centers
2. For every y ∈ Y , let # S (y) denote the number of input points x i ∈ S such that y is their nearest candidate center, and let# S (y) be a noisy estimation of # S (y), satisfying LDP.
3. Post-process the set of candidate centers and the noisy counts to identify a set D of k centers that approximately minimizes cost
Step 2 is done using standard LDP counting tools (to be surveyed in Section 2).
Step 1 is more involved, and we will elaborate on it later. For now, it suffices to say that for any √ n Γ n, there is an LDP algorithm that is capable of identifying a set Y of size |Y | ≈ n/Γ that contains a subset of k centers
The analysis then goes by arguing that, for any set of k centers D we have that
where cost Y,# (D) is the same as cost Y,# (D) but with the "true" counts # S (y) instead of the estimated counts# S (y). This means that the set of centers D computed in Step 3 also has a low k-means cost w.r.t. the input points S, and is hence a good output. The main question is how tight are these connections. Using the fact that there is a subset of k centers Y * ⊆ Y with low k-means cost, one can easily show that the connection cost Y,# (D) ≈ cost S (D) holds, informally, up to an additive error of O(Γ).
The difficulty lies in the connection cost Y,# (D) ≈ cost Y,# (D). As we mentioned, it is known that estimating counts under LDP generally incurs an additive error of Θ( √ n). As a result, for every y ∈ Y the estimation error # S (y) − # S (y) might be as big as
, the different noises "add up". To illustrate this point, let us assume that k = 1, and let D = {d} be a possible center. We have that
Actually, it can be shown that the additive error only increases proportionally to |Y | · n, because of noise cancellations (as the sum of |Y | independent noises only scales with |Y |). At any case, at least with this type of an analysis, the error in the the connection cost
scales with |Y | · n. Recall that the error in the other connection cost
That is, the error in one of the two connections grows with |Y |, and the error in the second connection decreases with |Y |. These two requirements balance at |Y | ≈ n 1/3 , which results in an additive error of √ n 1/3 · n = n/n 1/3 = n 2/3 . In a nutshell, this is the main reason for the large additive error in the construction of [18] . The construction of [23] suffered from similar issues (although their algorithm is very different from that of [18] ).
Our Contributions
The takeaway from the above discussion is that if we could privately identify a small set Y of candidate centers, say |Y | = O(k), that contains a subset Y * ⊆ Y with low k-means cost, then the error incurred due to estimating the weights # S (y) would be small, and our task would be completed. At a high level, our strategy is to first start with a "large" set Y of candidate centers of size |Y | ≈ √ n, and then to privately identify a small subset Z ⊆ Y of size |Z| = O(k) that has a low k-means cost. That is, instead of trying to identify k centers directly out of Y , we first identify O(k) centers, and then use these O(k) centers in order to identify a set of k centers from Y . The main question is how to identify the subset Z ⊆ Y . We next give an informal overview of our construction. Our construction includes several different components, and we introduce here only some of them. Any informalities made hereafter will be removed in the sections that follow. Towards identifying a small subset Z ⊆ Y with low k-means cost, we design a private variant for the k-means++ algorithm of Arthur and Vassilvitskii [3] . Given an input database S ⊆ R d , the (non-private) k-means++ algorithm adaptively samples k data points from the database S, in such a way that the sampled set has a low k-means cost with high probability. Specifically, the algorithm of [3] can be described as follows.
1. Sample a point x ∈ S uniformly at random, and let C = {x}.
2. For ℓ = 2, . . . , k: Sample a point x ∈ S with probability proportional to min c∈C x − c 2 and add x to C.
Arthur and Vassilvitskii [3] showed that the resulting set of centers C satisfies cost S (C) ≤ O(log k) · OPT S (k) with high probability. Furthermore, Aggarwal et al. [1] showed that when the same algorithm is executed for O(k) iterations, instead of exactly k, then the guarantee of the resulting set C is improved to cost S (C) ≤ O(1) · OPT S (k). In our case, we would like to design a private analogue for this algorithm that would allow us to identify a subset of O(k) candidate centers with low k-means cost (w.r.t. the input points S). The thing that works in our favor here (in terms of privacy), is that unlike in the non-private k-means++ algorithm, we are not selecting the centers directly out of the input points themselves. We select the centers form the set Y of candidate centers, which was privately computed in the previous steps of our algorithm. The only thing we need to access the data for, is to compute (or estimate) the probabilities with which we sample centers from Y . Recall that we write # S (y) to denote the number of input points whose closest neighbor in Y is y, that is, # S (y) = |{x ∈ S : y = argmin y ′ ∈Y x−y ′ }|. Intuitively, we would like to design a private variant for the k-means++ algorithm that uses the estimates# S (y) to compute the probabilities with which candidate centers are sampled. However, this does not quite work. What we can show is that this strategy works if the set of candidate centers Y satisfies the following two conditions:
While our (privately computed) set of candidate centers is guaranteed to satisfy the first condition above, we do not have any guarantee w.r.t. the second condition. The reason that the second condition is useful, is that when it holds, for every y ∈ Y we would have that our estimation# S (y) is accurate up to a constant multiplicative factor. Intuitively this would mean that the probabilities with which centers are sampled are close to the "true" probabilities had they been computed from the "true" counts # S (y). To summarize our discussion so far, if we could privately identify a set Y of candidate centers that contains a subset Y * ⊆ Y with low k-means cost, and in addition, every candidate center y ∈ Y has "a lot" of neighbors in S, then we could apply a (privacy preserving) sampling process to identify O(k) centers. Afterwards, we could estimate the number of neighbors every such sampled center has in S, and from that we could post-process to identify k centers with low k-means cost.
First Attempt. One might try to achieve the second condition above by simply deleting every y ∈ Y such that# S (y) √ n. This would indeed mean that, after the deletions, for every y ∈ Y we have that the updated count # S (y) is at least √ n. However, this might break condition 1. To see how this could happen, suppose that k = d = 2, and consider a collection of points p 1 , . . . , p √ n around the point (1, 0), where every two points p i , p j are at pairwise distance ≈ ρ (infinitely small), and all of them are within distance ≈ ρ to the point (1, 0). Now consider a database containing (n − n 3/4 ) copies of the point (0, 0), and n 1/4 copies of every p i (so that S is of size n). Now suppose that Y = {(0, 0), (0, 1), p 1 , . . . , p √ n }. Since our count estimations are only accurate up to an error of √ n, we will have that# S (0, 0) ≈ n − n 3/4 , and that# S (y) ≈ 0 for every other point in Y . Hence, if we were to delete every y ∈ Y with a small estimated count, then we would be left only with the point (0, 0), that misses the cluster around (0, 1), and hence cost S (Y ) n 3/4 , even though OPT S (k) ≈ 0.
To overcome this challenge, we revisit the way in which the set of candidate centers Y is constructed. We will identify additional properties for the candidate centers, and use these properties in order to assign input points to centers in a different way (not by assigning every input point to its nearest candidate center). Our new way for assigning points to candidate centers will guarantee that the two conditions above hold, and hence, we could apply our private k-means++ sampling procedure. The details are given in Sections 3 and 4. We remark that all of our techniques extend to k-median clustering. The results are stated for k-means clustering for concreteness.
In Section 5 we show that the additive error achieved by our construction is almost optimal. Specifically, we present a lower bound showing that every constant-round LDP algorithm for the k-means must have additive error Ω( √ n). This lower bound follows from a simple reduction from a task (related to) counting bits to the task of approximating the k-means of the data, together with known lower bounds for counting bits under LDP.
Other Related Works
Nock et al. [25] also designed a private variant for the k-means++ algorithm. Their algorithm is inapplicable in our setting because of two reasons. First, their algorithm is designed for the trusted-curator model, where we operate in the local model. And second, their algorithm has additive errorÕ(n), where we are aiming for additive error ≈ √ n. Recall that in our construction we sample centers from the (already privately computed) set of candidate centers, and only access the data to estimate the probabilities with which we sample the centers. In contrast, Nock et al. [25] computes the exact sampling probabilities (which they can do since they operate in the trusted-curator model), and then privatize the sampled points using the Laplace mechanism.
Preliminaries
In k-means clustering we aim to partition n points into k clusters in which each point x belongs to the cluster whose mean is closest to x. Formally, for a set of points S ∈ (R d ) n and a set of centers C ⊆ R d , the cost of C w.r.t. the points S is defined as
For a weighted set S = {(
Definition 2.1 (k-means). Let S be a (weighted or unweighted) finite set of points in
For a set of points S ∈ (R d ) n we use OPT S (k) to denote the cost of the k-means of S. That is,
We require the following folklore lemma, that quantifies the 1-means cost of a centerĉ in terms of its distance from the optimal center (for a proof see, e.g., [4, Fact 2.3 
.1]).
Lemma 2.3. Let S ⊆ R d be a set of points, and let c denote the average of S. For anyĉ ∈ R d it holds that x∈S x −ĉ 2 = |S| · ĉ − c 2 + x∈S x − c 2 .
Preliminaries from local differential privacy
The local model of differential privacy was formally defined first in [11, 19] . We give here the formulation presented by Vadhan [27] . Consider n parties P 1 , . . . , P n , where each party is holding a data item x i . We denote X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and refer to X as a distributed database. A protocol proceeds in a sequence of rounds until all (honest) parties terminate. Informally, in each round, each party selects a message to be broadcast based on its input, internal coin tosses, and all messages received in previous rounds. The output of the protocol is specified by a deterministic function of the transcript of messages exchanged.
For some j ∈ [n], we consider an adversary controlling all parties other than P j . Given a particular adversary strategy A, we write View A ((A ↔ (P 1 , . . . , P n ))(X)) for the random variable that includes everything that A sees when participating in the protocol (P 1 , . . . , P n ) on input X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ). Definition 2.4 (Local differential privacy [11, 19, 8, 27] ). A protocol P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) satisfies (ε, δ)-local differential privacy (LDP) if, for every j ∈ [n], for every adversary A controlling all parties other than P j , for every two datasets X, X ′ that differ on P j 's input (and are equal otherwise), the following holds for every set T :
As is standard in the literature on local differential privacy, we will consider protocols in which there is a unique player, called the server, which has no input of its own. All other players are called users. Typically, users do not communicate with other users, only with the server.
Counting queries and histograms
The most basic task that we can apply in the local model of differential privacy is counting. Let X ∈ {0, 1} n be a database which is distributed among n users (each holding one bit), and consider the task of estimating the number of users holding a 1. This can be solved privately with error proportional to 1 ε √ n (see, e.g., [19] ). A more general setting is when instead of a binary domain, every user holds an input item from some (potentially) large domain U . This can be solved using tools from the recent line of work on heavy hitters in the local model. [15, 7, 6, 10] Notation. For a database X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ U n and a domain element u ∈ U , we use f X (u) to denote the multiplicity of u in X, i.e., f X (u) = |{x i ∈ X : x i = u}|. [15, 7, 6, 10] ). Fix β, ε ≤ 1. There exists a non-interactive (ε, 0)-LDP protocol that operates on a (distributed) database X ∈ U n for some finite set U , and returns a mappingf : U → R such that the following holds. For every choice of u ∈ U , with probability at least 1 − β, we have that
Theorem 2.5 (LDP Histograms
For our construction, we will also need the following extension of Theorem 2.5. This extension is obtained from the analysis of [6] with minor modifications (see [18] for the details). Theorem 2.6 (Algorithm GroupHist [18] ). Fix β, ε ≤ 1. There exists a non-interactive (ε, 0)-LDP algorithm that operates on a (distributed) database S ∈ Y n for some finite set Y , and returns a mappingf : Y → R such that the following holds. For every choice of a subset Q ⊆ Y with weights σ : Q → [0, 1], with probability at least 1 − β, we have that
Note that Theorem 2.5 can be obtained from Theorem 2.6 by taking Q = {y} for some domain element y with σ(y) = 1.
Candidate Centers with Additional Properties
As we explained in the introduction, similarly to [18] , the first step in our construction is to privately identify a set Y of candidate centers that contains a subset of k candidates with low k-means cost.
To that end, let S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) be a (distributed) database, and let
be the optimal partition of S to k clusters according to C opt , i.e., S opt ℓ contains all input points whose closest optimal center is c opt ℓ . In order to guarantee that the set Y that we are constructing contains a subset of k centers with low cost, it suffices to argue that for every "large enough" cluster S opt ℓ , the set Y contains a center y ℓ that is "close enough" to the optimal center c . Therefore, in order to privately compute a set Y that contains a subset of k centers with low cost, it suffices to solve the following informal problem: Problem 3.1. Design an LDP algorithm that operates on a (distributed) database S and return a "small" set of centers Y such that the following holds. For every subset P ⊆ S of size |P | √ n (unknown to the algorithm), with probability at least 1 − β the set Y contains a center y ∈ Y such that y − Average(P ) ≤ O(diam(P )).
Using the union bound over the k optimal clusters, such an algorithm would identify a set Y that, with probability at least 1 − kβ, contains a center y ℓ for every "large enough" optimal cluster S opt ℓ in the sense that y ℓ is "close enough" to c opt ℓ . Actually, it suffices to focus on a simpler version of this problem, in which the algorithm gets as input the diameter r of the unknown set of points P . The reason is that given such an algorithm we could run it in parallel with exponentially growing choices for the parameter r, and take the union of all the sets Y that we get in this process.
Our construction makes use of an LDP tool of [23, 18] for this problem, called GoodCenters. This tool, in its original form, was presented by Nissim and Stemmer [23] in a slightly different context, and was repurposed for this problem by [18] . Algorithm GoodCenters takes a parameter r, and aims at identifying a center that is close to every "large enough" cluster of diameter r. At a high level, algorithm GoodCenters works by hashing input points using a locality sensitive hash function, that aims to maximize the probability of a collision for "close" items, while minimizing the probability of collision for "far" items. The hope is that input points which are clustered will be hashed to the same hash value, while input items that are "far" from this cluster will not be hashed into that value. Hence, we could privately identify (using an LDP tool for the heavy-hitters problem) all "heavy" hash values (these are hash values such that "a lot" of inputs are hashed into them). This is useful since it can be used as a filter that isolates clustered points, which can then be average with small error under LDP. The actual construction is more involved, and in particular includes randomly partitioning the data into subsets and applying multiple hash functions to increases the probability of success.
We identify additional properties of algorithm GoodCenters, which will be useful for us in the following section. Our contribution here is mostly conceptual -in identifying the necessary properties and in showing that they are achieved by the algorithm. Most of the technical details in the construction and in the analysis of GoodCenters have already appeared in [23, 18] . Therefore, here we only state the new properties of the algorithm, and defer the details to the appendix. 
. Algorithm GoodCenters satisfies (ε, δ)-LDP. Furthermore, let S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) be a distributed database where every x i is a point in the ddimensional ball B(0, Λ), and let GoodCenters be executed on S with parameters r, t, β, ε, δ. Denote M = 4n a ln( 
Let P ⊆ S be a set of t points which can be enclosed in a ball of radius r. With probability at least 1 − β there existsŷ ∈ Y such that the ball of radius 5cr aroundŷ contains all of P .
Our modification to algorithm GoodCenters is captured by Item 1 above, together with altering the algorithm to output also the partition I 1 , . . . , I M ⊆ [n], the hash functions h 1 , . . . , h M , and the lists of hash values L 1 , . . . , L M (in the formulation of [23, 18] , the algorithm only outputs the set Y ).
Algorithm WeightedCenters
In this section we present our main construction -algorithm WeightedCenters. In order to identify a set of k centers with low k-means cost, the algorithm begins by executing algorithm GoodCenters on the (distributed) database S multiple times, with exponentially growing choices for the parameter r (given to algorithm GoodCenters). Every such execution with parameter r identifies M sets of centers Y r 1 , . . . , Y r M that "captures" every optimal cluster whose (average) radius is ≈ r. In more details, let C opt = {c opt 1 , . . . , c opt k } be an optimal set of centers for the database S, and let S opt 1 , . . . , S opt k be the optimal partition of S to k clusters according to
denote the "average" radius of the optimal cluster S opt ℓ . Now fix some ℓ ∈ [k] such that |S opt ℓ | is "large enough". As we will see, the application of GoodCenters with radius r ≈ r opt ℓ identifies (w.h.p.) a center y that is a good center for the cluster S opt ℓ . Hence, the set of all centers identified in this process (across all choices for r), denoted as Y , contains a set of k candidates with low k-means cost. We refer to Y as the set of candidate centers.
The main question is how to identify a subset of k centers from Y with low k-means cost. The challenge is that in the local model of differential privacy we do not have direct access to the database S. One option to approach this challenge, as was shown by Kaplan and Stemmer [18] , is to privately estimate for every candidate center y ∈ Y the number of input points x ∈ S that y is their nearest candidate center. The set of candidate centers Y , together with these estimated counts, can be post-processed to obtain an approximation to the k-means of the database S. However, due to the amout of noise needed to ensure privacy and the fact that different noises can "add up", this strategy only results in a set of k centers with additive error ≈ n 2/3+a for a > 0 (arbitrarily small).
We will identify a k-subset of Y in a more involved way, that achieves additive error n 0.5+a . Recall that an execution of GoodCenters with parameters r, t returns a partition 
We introduce the following notation.
Notation 4.1. Given the outcomes of GoodCenters (with parameter r), we say that a point x i ∈ S (or, alternatively, that the i th user) creates a centerŷ r m,u ∈ Y r m if i ∈ I r m and h r m (x i ) = u and x i −ŷ r m,u ≤ 5cr. Observe that a point x i ∈ S creates at most one center in
. If x i ∈ S creates a center in Y r , then we say that x i creates a center for the radius r.
Remark 4.2. Algorithm GoodCenters construct the candidate centers in Y by averaging (with noise) subsets of input points (where input point in the same subset are "close" to each other). Informally, we think of the set of points who "create" a centerŷ ∈ Y as the set of points s.t.ŷ ∈ Y was computed as their (noisy) average in GoodCenters. However, to simplify the analysis, the actual definition is a bit different (as stated above). 
Input: Failure probability β, privacy parameters ε, δ.
Setting: Each player j ∈ [n] holds a value x j ∈ B(0, Λ). Define S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ).
1. Constructing candidate centers: 3. Estimating weights of candidate centers: Use an ε 4 -LDP algorithm for histograms (see Theorem 2.5) to obtain for every y ∈ Y an estimationâ(y) ≈ a(y) |{i : a(i, x i ) = y}|.
4.
Re-assigning points to candidate centers:
, and define b(i, x i ) = a(i, x i ) if a(i, x i ) ∈ W , and otherwise define b(i, x i ) to be an arbitrary center in W with minimal distance to x i .
5.
Re-estimating weights of candidate centers: Use an (a) Pick a center w ∈ W with probability proportional tob(w) · min z∈Z i−1 w − z 2 (for i = 1 the distribution is proportional tob(w)).
7. Amplifying success probability: Repeat Step 6 for O log( 
-LDP algorithm for histograms (specifically, using the algorithm from Theorem 2.6) to obtain for every z ∈ Z an estimationζ(z) ≈ ζ(z) |{i : Z(x i ) = z}|, where Z(x i ) is the nearest neighbor of x i in Z.
9.
Output: Non-privately identify a subset K ⊆ Y of size k with low cost w.r.t. the weighted set (Z,ζ).
We begin the utility analysis by defining the following two events. The first event states that the executions of GoodCenters (in Step 1 of WeightedCenters) succeed. Specifically, the set of candidate centers (resulting from Step 1) contains a "close enough" center for every large optimal cluster, and in addition, for every candidate center y ∈ Y there are "a lot" of users who created y.
Event CREATION (over the executions of GoodCenters): By Theorem 2.5, Event HISTOGRAMS happens with probability at least 1 − β. We continue with the analysis assuming that Events CREATION and HISTOGRAMS occur.
Recall that in Step 1 we generate the set of candidate centers Y and that in Step 4 we define the subset W ⊆ Y . The next two claims show that for every center y ∈ Y there exists a center w ∈ W that is "close enough" to y (even if y / ∈ W ). The next claim shows that if y ∈ Y \ W then there is another center y ′ ∈ Y that is close to y (but y ′ might also be missing from W ). This will be leveraged in the claim that follows to identify a center in W that is close to y. Claim 4.5. Let y ∈ Y be a center that was created with the radius r. If y / ∈ W , then there is another center y ′ ∈ Y that was created with a strictly smaller radius r ′ < r such that y − y ′ ≤ O(r). users who created the center y. Now, since y / ∈ W , it must be that for at least one user i who created y, we have that a(i, x i ) = y, as otherwise a(y) would be large and y would be in W (by Event HISTOGRAMS, the error in the estimationâ(y) ≈ a(y) is of a lower order). There could be two possible reasons for why a(i, x i ) = y:
Case (a): User i also created another center y ′ for a smaller radius r ′ < r. In this case, since user i created both y and y ′ we have that x i − y ≤ O(r) and x i − y ′ ≤ O(r ′ ), and hence y − y ′ ≤ O(r + r ′ ) = O(r) by the triangle inequality.
Case (b): User i did not create a center for any radius smaller than r, but there is a center y ′ created with radius r ′ < r (that user i did not create) such that x i − y ′ < x i − y . Since user i did create y, we have that x i − y ≤ O(r), and hence, we again have that y − y ′ ≤ O(r) by the triangle inequality.
The next claim applies the previous claim iteratively to identify a sequence of centers beginning from y ∈ Y \ W and ending in a center w ∈ W such that every two adjacent centers in this sequence are close to each other. Claim 4.6. Let y ∈ Y be a center that was created with the radius r. Then there is a center w ∈ W such that y − w ≤ O(r).
Proof. First observe that, by the definition of a(·, ·), if a user i creates a center y ′ for r = Λ n (the smallest possible radius) then a(i, x i ) = y ′ . Hence, for every center y ′ created with r = Λ n we have that a(y ′ ) is large, and hence, y ′ appears also in W . Now consider a center y ∈ Y that was created with the radius r. If y ∈ W then the claim is trivial. Otherwise, by induction using Claim 4.5, there is a sequence of centers y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y w such that y 1 = y and y w ∈ W , and such that y 1 − y 2 ≤ O(r) and y i − y i+1 ≤ 1 2 y i+1 − y i+2 (since y i+1 was created with a strictly smaller radius than y i ).
The next claim shows that the set W (constructed in Step 4) contains a subset of k centers with low k-means cost.
Proof. Recall that, by Event CREATION, for every large optimal cluster S opt ℓ , the set Y contains a center y * ℓ ∈ Y , which were created for a radius r * ℓ , such that
. . , y * k ∈ Y and r * 1 , . . . , r * k denote the aforementioned centers and the radiuses for which they were created (ignoring small clusters). Now, by Claim 4.6, the set W contains centers w * 1 , . . . , w * k such that for every large cluster S opt ℓ we have
Hence, by the triangle inequality we have that
If it were the case that all of the clusters are large, then we would have that
Now, the cost of a small cluster is at most
log(n) · Λ 2 , and there could be at most k such small clusters. Taking them into account, we have that
In
Step 5 of WeightedCenters we define an assignment b(·, ·) of the input points to the centers in W . If this assignment would simply assign each point to its nearest center in W , then (as W contains a good set of centers by the previous claim), this assignment would trivially have a low k-means cost. However, the assignment b(·, ·) does not necessarily match every point to its nearest center. Nevertheless, as the next claim shows, this assignment still has low k-means cost.
Claim 4.8.
Proof. Fix a large optimal cluster S opt ℓ , and let x i ∈ S opt ℓ . By Event CREATION, a center y * ℓ for the cluster S opt ℓ is created with radius r * ℓ ≤ max{2r
(But it is not necessarily the case that x i created y * ℓ .) Let y(x i ) ∈ Y denote the center with the smallest radius that was created by x i , and let r(x i ) denote the radius for which y(x i ) was created. Note that y(x i ) might not be in W . There are two cases:
can take the value y * ℓ if it minimizes the distance to x i . Now, we either have that b(i, x i ) = a(i, x i ) if a(i, x i ) ∈ W , or else b(i, x i ) is set to be the closest center in W to x i , denoted as W (x i ). So
So, in any case, we have that
where W * ⊆ W is a subset minimizing the k-means cost, and where the last inequality follows from Claim 4.7.
We write B to denote the set W with weights {b(w)}. That is, B is a multiset of points containing b(w) copies of every w ∈ W . Alternatively, B is the multiset B = {b(i, x i ) : i ∈ [n]}. We also writeB to denote the set W with the noisy weights {b(w)}. The noisy weights might not be integers (and, in principle, could also be negative, but this does not happen when Event HISTOGRAMS occurs). The next claim shows that for every set of centers D we have that cost S (D) ≈ cost B (D).
Claim 4.9. For every set of centers D ⊆ R d we have
and,
Proof. For a set of centers C and a point x we write C(x) to denote the closest neighbor of x in C. By Claim 4.8, for any set of centers D ⊆ R d we have,
and similarly,
We next analyze Step 6 of WeightedCenters, and show that (with constant probability) the set Z t obtained after the 100k iterations of Step 6 has a low k-means cost. Our analysis for this Step of the algorithm is an adaptation of the analysis of Aggarwal et al. [1] to our case. Building on the analysis of the k-means++ algorithm of [3] , Aggarwal et al. showed that when adaptively sampling O(k) centers from a set of points S (with probabilities proportional to the squared distance to the current centers), the resulting set of centers has low k-means cost with constant probability (w.r.t. S). In our case, however, we do not have direct access to the points in S, and cannot sample points from it. Instead, we sample the centers from the (carefully designed) set W , where points in W are weighted byb. We show that even though the sampling in Step 6 is done w.r.t. W with the noisy weightsb, the resulting set of centers also has low k-means cost w.r.t. W and the (noiseless) weights b, i.e., with respect to B. We have already established that for any set of centers D, its costs w.r.t. S and B are similar, and hence, we will get that the sampled set of centers also has low k-means cost w.r.t. S.
Let C = (c 1 , . . . , c k ) be a set of optimal centers for B, that is cost B (C) = OPT B (k) and let B 1 , . . . , B k be the induced partition of B according to C. Also let W 1 , . . . , W k denote the partition of the points in W according to the same centers C. Note that for every ℓ ∈ [k] we have that B ℓ and W ℓ contain the same distinct points, but B ℓ might contain multiple copies of every point. Before the ith iteration of Step 6 (where 1 ≤ i ≤ t = 100k) we define
Note that the definition of which clusters are "bad" and which clusters are "good" is done w.r.t. B (that is, w.r.t. W with the exact weights b), despite the fact that we sample centers fromB and not from B.
Lemma 4.10. In the i th iteration of Step 6, either cost B (Z i−1 ) ≤ 320 · cost B (C), or else the probability of picking a point w from some cluster in Bad i is at least 1/2.
Proof. First observe that, by Event HISTOGRAMS, for every w ∈ W we have that 
In addition, by Event HISTOGRAMS, for every w ∈ W we have that |b(w)−b(w)| ≤ O 1 ε n · log( n β ) ≪ b(w), and hence, for every w ∈ W we have
Recall that C = (c 1 , . . . , c k ) denotes an optimal set of centers for B, and that B 1 , . . . , B k denotes the partition of B according to C.
x − c ℓ 2 , and let ℓ = B ℓ ∩ B(c ℓ , r ℓ ). Intuitively, ℓ contains the points in B ℓ that are "close enough" to the optimal center c ℓ , so that if we sample a point w ∈ ℓ then the ℓ th cluster would become good.
We have already established that in every iteration i, either the set of centers Z i already has a low enough k-means cost, or with high probability we pick a point w that belongs to a bad cluster B ℓ . We will now further show that with constant probability this point in fact belongs to ℓ ⊆ B ℓ , in which case the cluster B ℓ becomes good. This will mean that with constant probability a bad cluster becomes good, and hence, after O(k) iterations either all clusters are good or Z i already has low k-means cost.
First note that for every ℓ ∈ [k] we have that | ℓ | ≥ 1 2 |B ℓ |, as otherwise less than half of the points in B ℓ are within distance r ℓ to c ℓ , and so cost B ℓ ({c ℓ }) > |B ℓ | 2 · (r ℓ ) 2 = cost B ℓ ({c ℓ }). So P ℓ contains a lot of points. To show that a point is picked from ℓ with high probability, we also analyze in the next lemma the weights of points in ℓ in comparison to the weights of the other points in B ℓ . This will show that, conditioning on the next point w being chosen from B ℓ , there is a constant probability of it in fact being in ℓ . We will use Ï ℓ to denote the set containing every point appearing in the multiset ℓ .
Lemma 4.11. For the point w picked during the ith iteration we have that
Proof. We use Z i−1 (c ℓ ) to denote the closest point in Z i−1 to the optimal center c ℓ . We denote s = c ℓ − Z i−1 (c ℓ ) . Using Lemma 2.3 we get that
In addition, for every z ∈ Z i−1 and w ∈ ℓ we have that
(since w ∈ ℓ and hence within distance r ℓ from c ℓ )
In addition, c ℓ − Z i−1 (c ℓ ) − r ℓ ≥ 0, since otherwise B ℓ would not be bad, and hence
We therefore get that
where the last inequality follows from the fact that s ≥ 3r ℓ , which holds since B ℓ is a bad cluster.
So, as long as the set of centers Z i is not "good enough", in every iteration of Step 6 there is a constant probability of picking a point w that makes at least one "bad" cluster become "good". As the next lemma shows, this means that after the O(k) iterations of Step 6, either all clusters are good or Z i already has low k-means cost.
Lemma 4.12. The set Z t obtained after the 100k iterations of Step 6 satisfies cost B (Z t ) ≤ 320 · OPT B (k) with probability at least 1/100. Proof sketch. For every i ∈ [100k] define an indicator variable X i , where . So, by Markov's inequality we get that Pr[X 1 + · · · + X 100k ≥ 99k] ≤ 0.99, which means that with probability at least 0.01 there are at least k indicators that attain the value 0. In this case we either have that cost B (Z t ) ≤ 320 · OPT B (k), or we have that there are no more bad clusters, in which case we again get that cost B (Z t ) ≤ 320 · OPT B (k).
Remark 4.13. We did not attempt to optimize any of the constants throughout the analysis. In particular, the analysis of Lemma 4.12 could be tightened using the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality.
Let Z ζ denote the set Z (from Step 7) with the weights ζ (from Step 8), and let Zζ denote the same set with the weightsζ (also from Step 8) . As the previous claim shows, every application of Step 6 return a set Z t that, with constant probability, has a low k-means cost w.r.t. B. In
Step 7 we repeat Step 6 for O(log 1 β ) times, and generate the set Z as the union of all the resulting sets Z t . Hence, with high probability, the set Z obtained in Step 7 has a low k-means cost w.r.t. B. The next claim further shows that in this case, for every set of centers
. That is, the next claim relates the k-means cost of every set of centers D w.r.t. the input database S and w.r.t. the set Z with the "true" weights ζ.
Claim 4.14. With probability at least 1 − β, for every set of centers D ⊆ R d we have
Proof. By Lemma 4.12, every execution of Step 6 results in a set Z t such that cost B (Z t ) ≤ 320 · OPT B (k) with probability at least 1/100. As the set Z (from Step 7) is constructed as the union of the outcomes of O(log 1 β ) applications of Step 6, with probability at least 1 − β we have that cost B (Z) ≤ 320 · OPT B (k). In this case, by Claim 4.9 we have
Now, for every set of centers D ⊆ R d we have
Similarly,
The next claim relates the k-means cost of every set of k centers D ⊆ Y w.r.t. the set Z ζ to its cost w.r.t. Zζ. Claim 4.15. With probability at least 1 − β, for every subset D ⊆ Y of size |D| = k we have
. . , G D k denote the partition of the points in Z, assigning them to the centers in D. That is, for every ℓ ∈ [k] and z ∈ G D ℓ we have that
. By the properties of algorithm GroupHist (Theorem 2.6), with probability at least 1 − β k·n k we have that
Using the union bound, this holds simultaneously for every ℓ ∈ [k] and every subset D ⊆ Y of size k with probability at least 1 − β. In this case, for every such D ⊆ Y we have
where the last inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (and by recalling that ℓ |G D ℓ | = |Z|). The analysis for the reverse direction is identical.
By now we have established that (w.h.p.), the set Y contains a subset of k centers with low cost w.r.t. S, and in addition, for every set of k centers D ⊆ Y we have that cost Zζ 
. Hence, we can use the (privately computed) weighted set Zζ as a proxy in order to identify k centers from Y with low cost w.r.t. S. This is formalized in the following theorem. Theorem 4.16. Algorithm WeightedCenters satisfies (ε, δ)-LDP. In addition, when executed on a (distributed) database S containing n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0, Λ), the algorithm returns a set of k centers D such that with probability at least 1 − O(β) we have
where a > b > 0 are arbitrarily small constants (the constant hiding in the multiplicative error depends on a and b).
Proof. The privacy properties of WeightedCenters are straightforward (follow from composition and post-processing). We now proceed with the utility analysis. Let Y S ⊆ Y be a subset of k centers in Y minimizing cost S (·), and let Y Zζ ⊆ Y be a subset of k centers in Y minimizing cost Zζ (·). The output (from Step 9) is a subset K ⊆ Y of size |K| = k such that
By Claim 4.15 (relating the cost w.r.t. Z ζ and w.r.t. Zζ), we have that
By Claim 4.14 (relating the cost w.r.t. Z ζ and w.r.t. S), we have that
Recall that in Claim 4.7 we showed that ∃W * ⊆ W ⊆ Y of size |W * | = k with low k-means cost.
In particular, this means that cost S (Y S ) is comparable to OPT S (k). Hence,
A Lower Bound on the Additive Error
In this section we present a simple lower bound on the error of every constant-round LDP algorithm for approximating the k-means. To get our lower bound, we show a reduction from the following problem, called Gap-Threshold, to the k-means problem, and then use an existing lower bound for the Gap-Threshold problem.
Definition 5.1 (Beimel et al. [8] ). For τ > 0 and x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ {0, 1},
Theorem 5.2. There exists constant 0 < ε, β < 1 such that the following holds. Let δ = o 1 n log n , and let A be an O(1)-round (ε, δ)-LDP protocol for computing GAP-TR τ with success probability
Theorem 5.2 is stated in [8] only for δ = 0, but their analysis easily extends to the δ > 0 case. We now show that this theorem implies a lower bound of Ω( √ n) on the additive error of O(1)-round LDP algorithms for the k-means, even when the dimension d is 1 and k = 2.
Theorem 5.3. There exists constant 0 < ε, β < 1 such that the following holds. Let δ = o 1 n log n , and let A be an O(1)-round (ε, δ)-LDP protocol that operates on a (distributed) database X ∈ ([0, 1]) n , and outputs a set C of k = 2 centers such that with probability 1 − β we have cost X (C) ≤ γ · OPT X (k) + τ , for any γ < ∞. Then τ = Ω( √ n).
Proof. Let β, ε be the constants from Theorem 5.2. Let A be an O(1)-round (ε, δ)-LDP protocol that operates on a (distributed) database X ∈ ([0, 1]) n and outputs a set C of size k = 2. We use A to construct a protocol for GAP-TR, described in protocol B. 2. The server and the users: Execute protocol A on the database X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) to obtain a set of centers C = {c 1 , c 2 }.
Protocol
3. The server: If c 1 ∈ I or c 2 ∈ I then return 1. otherwise return 0.
By Theorem 5.2, there exists a constant β > 0, an error parameter τ = Ω( √ n), and a database S * ∈ {0, 1} n such that B(S * ) = GAP-TR τ (S * ) with probability at least 1 − β. We now show that S * cannot be the all zero database. To that end, observe that if the input S is the all zero database, then all of the users in the protocol B ignore µ, and hence, algorithm A gets no information on the selected interval I. In that case, the probability that one of c 1 , c 2 falls in I is at most 2r. That is, the probability that B( 0) = 0 = GAP-TR τ ( 0) is at most 2r = β/2. Therefore, the database S * (on which B errs with probability at least β) is not the all zero database 0. Hence, S * contains at least τ ones. Therefore, whenever B errs on S * , we have that cost
though OPT X (k) = 0. This happens with probability at least β, which completes the proof. Consider a (distributed) database X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) where every user i is holding x i ∈ R d . One of the most basic tasks we can apply under local differential privacy is to compute a noisy estimation for the sum (or the average) of vectors in X. Specifically, every user sends the server a noisy estimation of its vector (e.g., by adding independent Gaussian noise to each coordinate), and the server simply sums all of the noisy reports to obtain an estimation for the sum of X.
Theorem A.1 (folklore). Consider a (distributed) database X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) where every user i is holding a point x i in the d dimensional ball B(0, Λ). There exists an (ε, δ)-LDP protocol for computing an estimation a for the sum of the vectors in X, such that with probability at least (1−β) we have
For our constructions we will need a tool for computing averages of subsets of X. Specifically, assume that there are n users, where user i is holding a point x i ∈ R d . Moreover, assume that we have a fixed (publicly known) partition of R d into a finite number of regions:
For every region R ℓ , we would like to obtain an estimation for the average of the input points in that region. For this purpose we introduce the following simple protocol, called LDP-AVG.
Protocol LDP-AVG Public parameters: Partition of R d into t regions R 1 , . . . , R T .
Setting: Each user i ∈ [n] holds a point x i ∈ R d . Define X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ).
Every user i:
Let y i = (y i,1 , . . . , y i,T ) ∈ (R d ) T be a vector whose every coordinate is an independent Gaussian noise. Specifically, every y i,t ∈ R d is a vector whose every coordinate is sampled i.i.d. from N (0, σ 2 t ), for σ t = 8·diam(Rt) ε ln(1.25/δ). Let t be s.t. x i ∈ R t . Add x i to y i,t . Send y i to the server.
2. The server and the users: Run the protocol from Theorem 2.5 with privacy parameter ε 2 . For every t ∈ [T ] the server obtains an estimationr t ≈ |{i : x i ∈ R t }| r t .
The server: Output a vectorâ
Claim A.2. LDP-AVG satisfies (ε, δ)-LDP. Moreover, with probability at least (1 − β), for every
we have that
Proof. The privacy properties of LDP-AVG follow from the privacy properties of the Gaussian mechanism and the protocol from Theorem 2.5, together with composition. Observe that by Theorem 2.5, with probability at least (1 − 
The claim now follows from a union bound.
A.1.2 Random rotation
We also use the following technical lemma to argue that if a set of points P is contained within a ball of radius r in R d , then by randomly rotating the Euclidean space we get that (w.h.p.) P is contained within an axis-aligned rectangle with side-length ≈ r/ √ d.
Lemma A.3 (e.g., [28] ). Let P ∈ (R d ) m be a set of m points in the d dimensional Euclidean space, and let Z = (z 1 , . . . , z d ) be a random orthonormal basis for R d . Then,
We now proceed with the utility analysis of algorithm CentersProcedure. We will assume the existence of a family H of (r, cr, p=n −b , q=n −2−a )-sensitive hash functions mapping R d to a universe U , for some constants a > b, r > 0, and c > 1.
Lemma A.6. Let β, ε, δ, n, d, Λ, r be such that Λ/r ≤ poly(n) and t ≥ O n 0.5+b · √ d ε log dn βδ and β ≤ n −a /28. Let S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) be a distributed database where every x i is a point in the ddimensional ball B(0, Λ), and let CentersProcedure be executed on S with the family H and with parameters r, t, β, ε, δ. The algorithm outputs a list of hash values L, a hash function h, and a set Y containing a centerŷ u for every u ∈ L, such that 1. The list L and the set Y are size at most 32·n 1+b t each.
2. W.p. at least 1−β, for every u ∈ L we have |{x ∈ S : h(x) = u and x−ŷ u ≤ 5cr}| ≥ t 8 ·n −b .
3. Let P ⊆ S be a set of t points which can be enclosed in a ball of radius r. With probability at least n −a /4 there exists u * ∈ L such that the ball of radius 3cr aroundŷ u * ∈ Y contains at least one point from P .
Proof. Items 1 and 2 of the lemma follow from the fact that in Step 8 we delete from the list L every element u that does not satisfy the condition of item 2. Specifically, for t ≥ O 1 ε n 0.5+b log( 1 β ) , our estimations in Step 8 are accurate enough such that the item holds with probability at least 1 − β, in which case the list L is short (a longer list can be trimmed). We now proceed with the analysis of item 3.
First observe that, w.l.o.g., we can assume that the range U of every function in H is of size |U | ≤ n 3 . If this is not the case, then we can simply apply a (pairwise independent) hash function with range n 3 onto the output of the locally sensitive hash function. Clearly, this will not decrease the probability of collusion for "close" elements (within distance r), and moreover, this can increase the probability of collusion for "non-close" elements (at distance at least cr) by at most n −3 = o(n −2−a ) = o(q). Now recall that by the properties of the family H, for every x, y ∈ R d s.t. x − y ≥ cr we have that Pr h∈H [h(x) = h(y)] ≤ q = n −2−a . Using the union bound we get
Let P ⊆ S denote the guaranteed set of t input points that are contained in a ball of radius r, and let x ∈ P be an arbitrary point in P . By linearity of expectation, we have that
Hence, by Markov's inequality,
So,
Simplifying, for large enough n (specifically, for n a−b ≥ 2) we get
So far we have established that with probability at least n −a /2 over the choice of h ∈ H in Step 1 the following events occur:
(E 1 ) For every x, y ∈ S s.t. x − y ≥ cr it holds that h(x) = h(y); and, (E 2 ) There exists a hash value in U , denoted u * , such that |{y ∈ P : h(y) = u * }| ≥ t 2 · n −b .
Event (E 1 ) states that if two points in S are mapped into the same hash value, then these points are close. Event (E 2 ) states that there is a "heavy" hash value u * ∈ U , such that "many" of the points in P are mapped into u * . We proceed with the analysis assuming that these two events occur.
On step 2, we identify a list L containing all such "heavy" hash values u ∈ U . Assuming that t ≥ O 1 ε · n 0.5+b · log(n/β) , Theorem 2.5 ensures that with probability at least 1 − β we have that u * ∈ L. We continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case.
On
Step 3 we generate a random orthonormal basis Z. By Lemma A.3, with probability at least (1 − β), for every x, y ∈ S and for every z i ∈ Z, we have that the projection of (x − y) onto z i is of length at most 2 ln(dn/β)/d · x − y . In particular, for every hash value u ∈ L we have that the projection of S u {x ∈ S : h(x) = u} onto every axis z i ∈ Z fits within an interval of length at most p = 2rc ln(dn/β)/d. Recall that we assume that input point come from B(0, Λ). Hence, for every x, y ∈ S we have (x − y) ∈ B(0, 2Λ). Now, as I = {I 1 , I 2 , . . . } is a partition of [−2Λ, 2Λ] into intervals of length p, for every axis z i ∈ Z and for every u ∈ U , we have that the projection of S u onto z i is contained within 1 or 2 consecutive intervals from I.
On step 4 we partition S into d subsets S i ⊆ S of size n d . By the Hoeffding bound, assuming that t ≥ 2 · n 0.5+b · 2d ln( 4d . Recall that the projection of S u * onto every axis z i ∈ Z fits within (at most) 2 consecutive intervals from I. Hence, for every axis z i ∈ Z, at least 1 interval from I contains at least half of the points from S i ∩ S u * , i.e., at least
points. Therefore, for
, Theorem 2.5 ensures that with probability at least 1 − β, for every z i ∈ Z we have that I(i, u * ) = argmax i∈I {a i (I, u * )} (defined on step 5) contains at least one point from S u * . 2 Hence, the intervalÎ(i, u * ) obtained by extending I(i, u * ) by p to each direction, contains (the projection of) all of the points from S u * (onto the i th axis). As a result, the box B(u * ), defined on step 7 as the box whose projection onto every axis i isÎ(i, u * ), contains all of S u * . We continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case. Observe that the diameter of B(u * ), as well as the diameter of every other box B(u) defined on step 6, is at most 3p √ d = 6cr ln(dn/β) =Õ(cr). On step 7 we use algorithm LDP-AVG to obtain, for every u ∈ L, an estimationŷ u for the average of {x ∈ S : h(x) = u and x ∈ B(u)}. Let us denote the true average of every such set as y u . By the properties of LDP-AVG (Claim A.2), assuming that t ≥ O , with probability at 2 The constraint on t in Theorem 2.5 depends logarithmically on the number of possible bins. In our case, there are 4Λ/p ≤ Λ √ d/r ≤ poly(n √ d) possible bins, where the last inequality is because we assumed that Λ/r ≤ poly(n).
least 1 − β we have that y u * −ŷ u * 2 ≤ cr. We continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case. Observe that y u * is the average of (some of) the points in S u * , and that every two points in S u * are within distance cr from each other. Hence, we get that a ball of radius 2cr around y u * contains all of S u * . In particular, as S u * contains at least some of the points from P (the guaranteed cluster radius r with t input points from S), we have that the ball of radius 2cr around y u * contains at least 1 point from P , and that the ball of radius 4cr around y u * contains all of P . Therefore, as y u * −ŷ u * 2 ≤ cr we get that a ball of radius 3cr aroundŷ u * contains at least one point from P , and that the ball of radius 5cr aroundŷ u * contains all of P . Recall that, by Event (E 2 ), there are at least t 2 · n −b input points x ∈ P such that h(x) = u * . Therefore, in Step 8 we have that v(u * ) ≥ t 2 · n −b . Therefore, with probability at least 1 − β we also have thatv(u * ) ≥ t 2 · n −b , because when t ≥ O 1 ε n 0.5+b log( 1 β ) then the error |v(u * ) −v(u * )| is small compared to v(u * ). This means that u * is not deleted from the list L in Step 8.
Overall, with probability at least n −a 2 − 7β we have that the output set Y (from Step 9) contains at least one vectorŷ u * s.t. the ball of radius 3cr aroundŷ contains at least one point from P .
3. Let P ⊆ S be a set of t points which can be enclosed in a ball of radius r. With probability at least 1 − β there existsŷ ∈ Y such that the ball of radius 5cr aroundŷ contains all of P .
Proof. Items 1 and 2 of the lemma follow directly from the properties of algorithm CentersProcedure. We now proceed with the analysis of item 3. Let P ⊆ S be s.t. |P | = t and diam(P ) ≤ r, and consider the following good event, which happens with probability at least 1 − β by the Chernoff bound (assuming that t ≥ 24M ln( We proceed with the analysis assuming that Event E 1 occurred. Let us say that the mth execution of CentersProcedure succeeds if ∃y m ∈ Y m such that the ball of radius 3cr around y m contains at least one point from P ∩ S m . Recall that we assume that t ≥ O n 0.5+a+b · √ d ε log( Hence, by the properties of algorithm CentersProcedure, every single execution succeeds with probability at least n −a /4. As the different executions of CentersProcedure are independent, when M ≥ 4n a ln( 1 β ), the probability that at least one execution succeeds is at least 1 − β. In this case, there is a point y ∈ Y = Y 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Y m such that the ball of radius 3cr around it contains at least one point from P , and hence, the ball of radius 5cr around y contains all of P .
